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Abstract 
 
The paper shows that in a New Keynesian (NK) model, an active interest rate feedback monetary 
policy, when combined with a Ricardian passive fiscal policy, à la Leeper-Woodford, may induce the 
onset of a Shilnikov chaotic attractor in the region of the parameter space where uniqueness of the 
equilibrium prevails locally. Implications, ranging from long-term unpredictability to global 
indeterminacy, are discussed in the paper. We find that throughout the attractor, the economy lingers in 
particular regions, within which the emerging aperiodic dynamics tend to evolve for a long time around 
lower-than-targeted inflation and nominal interest rates. This can be interpreted as a liquidity trap 
phenomenon, produced by the existence of a chaotic attractor, and not by the influence of an 
unintended steady state or the Central Bank's intentional choice of a steady state nominal interest rate at 
its lower bound. In addition, our finding of Shilnikov chaos can provide an alternative explanation for 
the controversial “loanable funds” over-saving theory, which seeks to explain why interest rates and, to 
a lesser extent inflation rates, have declined to current low levels, such that the real rate of interest is 
below the marginal product of capital. Paradoxically, an active interest rate feedback policy can cause 
nominal interest rates, inflation rates, and real interest rates unintentionally to drift downwards within a 
Shilnikov attractor set. Policy options to eliminate or control the chaotic dynamics are developed.   
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1.1. Prior research on chaos in economics 
 
A long literature exists on the search for policy relevant chaos in economics. The earliest literature used 
tests developed by physicists for detecting chaos in data produced from controlled experiments. Those 
tests focused primarily on measuring the Hausdorf dimension of the attractor set and testing for 
positive dominant Liapunov exponent.6 Using those tests, Barnett and Chen (1988a,b) found chaos in 
monetary aggregate data.  Many relevant published papers followed.  But since the data were not 
produced from a controlled experiment and the tests did not condition on an economic model, the tests 
had no way to impute the source of the chaos to the nonlinear dynamics of the economy.  For example, 
the source of the chaos could be from the weather or the climate impacting the economy. 
 
Attention then moved to the possibility of formal statistical testing of the null hypothesis of chaos 
within a dynamic macroeconomic model. But this approach was found to be prohibitively difficult. 
Analytical solution for the boundaries of the chaotic subset of the parameter space is not currently 
possible with more than three parameters. Iterative numerical search for that subset is possible. But 
even if the set has been found, the geometric properties of the set, which may be a fractal, violate the 
regularity conditions for available statistical sets. For example, the likelihood function can have 
singularities as it passes over the null hypothesis set.7   
 
Faced with such statistical inference problems, research turned to exploration of the theoretical 
properties of macroeconomic models. In a famous paper, Grandmont (1985) found that a classical 
model’s parameter space is stratified into an infinite number of subsets separated by period doubling 
bifurcation boundaries. Based upon the subset within which the parameters are located, the solution of 
the model could be monotonically stable, damped stable, periodic unstable, multiperiodic, or – after a 
converged infinite number of bifurcations – chaotic.  But since the classical model contains no market 
imperfections, all solutions are Pareto Optimal. Hence no clear reason exists for governmental 
intervention.  If the parameters are in the chaotic region, then the chaos is Pareto Optimal, and 
governmental attempts to control the chaos could produce a Pareto loss, harming welfare. In addition, it 
has been speculated that the parameter settings leading to chaos in a classical model may not be 
plausible (see, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 261)). 
 
Research then turned to exploring the theoretical properties of NK models, within which governmental 
intervention can be justified. Findings of chaos in a NK model at plausible settings of parameters, when 
policy is based on active interest rate feedback rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have been reported by 
Benhabib et al (2002).  But implications of that chaos for policy are not clear, with available fiscal 
policy options appearing to be ineffective as possible solutions to the problem. 
 
Policy relevance of chaos in economics depends not only upon the existence of chaos at plausible 
settings of parameter values, but also the nature of the chaos.  Many kinds of chaos exist.  For example, 
Li-Yorke chaos (for dynamical systems generated by interval maps), Lorentz attractor (a type of chaos 
from atmospherical dynamical model), Smale horse-shoe chaos (with origin from celestial mechanics), 
 
6 For a relevant newer approach, see Kuznetsov (2016). 
 
7 See, e.g., Geweke (1992). Inference procedures that might be applicable under such nonstandard conditions are extremely 
difficult to apply and have not been attempted.  See, e.g., Section 4 of Geweke and Durham (2019). 
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and Shilnikov chaos for a particular scenario/criterion related to the Shilnikov homoclinic orbit. We 
chose to investigate Shilnikov chaos for multiple reasons. One reason is that it can be detected directly 
from the Shilnikov criterion. But also, as explained by Alan Champneys (2011), “Over the years, 
Shilnikov’s mechanism of chaos has proven to be one of the most robust and frequently occurring 
mechanisms chosen by nature.” 
 
As pointed out by Afraimovich et al (2014, p. 19), “Only starting from mid 70s–80s, when researchers 
became interested in computer studies of chaotic behavior in nonlinear models, it became clear that the 
Shilnikov saddle-focus is a pivotal element of chaotic dynamics in a broad range of real-world 
applications. In general, the number of various models from hydrodynamics, optics, chemical kinetics, 
biology etc., which demonstrated the numerically or experimentally strange attractors with the 
characteristic spiral structure suggesting the occurrence of a saddle focus homoclinic loop, was 
overwhelming. Indeed, this scenario has turned out to be typical for a variety of systems and models of 
very diverse origins.”  The relevancy of this general observation to economics has been confirmed by 
the finding of Shilnikov chaos in an economic growth model by Bella, Mattana, Venturi (2017). We 
find potentially high relevance of Shilnikov chaos to current problems in the world’s macroeconomies, 
when active Taylor rule monetary feedback policy is adjoined to a NK dynamic macroeconomic model. 
 
1.2. Our approach 
 
As stated by Christiano and Takahashi (2018), “Monetary models are notorious for having multiple 
equilibria.  The standard NK model, which assumes that fiscal policy is passive and monetary policy is 
set by a Taylor rule is no exception.” In fact, a large literature exists on complicated dynamics 
problems produced by NK models with Taylor rule interest rate feedback policies.  Our research 
introduces new problems, which we believe are potentially highly relevant to policy challenges in 
recent years.  We also propose potential solutions to the problems.   
 
Many papers have shown that following an aggressive interest rate policy, in accordance with the 
Taylor Principle, is not a sufficient criterion for stability in the NK model.8 One major obstacle to 
uniqueness is that the stance of fiscal policy may collide with the central bank's inflation objective, 
when fiscal policy is unable or unwilling to adjust primary surpluses to stabilize government debt 
(Kumhof et al., 2010).9 Further limits may result from the way preferences and technologies are 
introduced into the model.  
 
 
8 For example, following the Taylor Principle is not sufficient in the presence of nominal capital income taxation (Røisland 
(2003) and Edge and Rudd (2007)), or in the presence of high government consumption (Natvik (2009), Galí et al. (2004)), 
or in the presence of trend inflation (Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Kiley (2007)). The greater the effective capital 
income tax or the greater the government consumption, the more aggressively the interest rate should respond to inflation, 
to attain a determinate equilibrium. 
 
9 Regardless of the stance of fiscal policy, the role that the demand for money by agents plays in the monetary-transmission 
mechanism may undermine uniqueness of the equilibrium and stimulate the onset of expectation-driven fluctuations (cf. 
Benhabib et al. 2001a,b). Sveen and Weinke (2005, 2007) show that inclusion of firm-specific capital in a standard NK 
model can lead to multiple equilibria with aggressive interest rate policies. 
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In this paper, using the path-breaking work of Shilnikov (1965), we find that there may be further 
reasons to distrust the ability of Taylor rules to be conducive to stability.10 We show that this policy 
may induce a class of policy difficulties, emerging from the onset of a chaotic attractor. If the economy 
becomes enmeshed in a chaotic attractor, the policy maker faces unwanted challenges. Within a chaotic 
attractor, there is sensitivity to initial conditions, even to infinitesimal changes in initial conditions.  
Long term predictions become nearly impossible, since an initial condition is known only to a finite 
degree of precision. It becomes impossible to predict dynamics far into the future. Small changes in 
initial conditions have major effects on future temporal evolution. 
 
Moreover, given the initial value of the predetermined variable, there would exist a continuum of initial 
values of the jump variables giving rise to admissible equilibria. Policy options required for recovering 
uniqueness suggested by the local analysis are exactly those which would cause global indeterminacy 
of the equilibrium. 
 
Additionally, the qualitative “dimensions” of the chaotic attractor are of great interest in the present 
context.11 The relative frequency with which an orbit visits different regions of the attractor is 
heterogeneous. Then, throughout the attractor, the economy lingers on regions with higher “densities.” 
This is exactly what happens in the numerical simulations developed in this paper. If the initial 
conditions of the jump variables are chosen far enough from the target steady state, then the emerging 
aperiodic dynamics continue to evolve over a long period of time around lower-than-targeted inflation 
and nominal interest rates. This can be interpreted as a liquidity trap phenomenon that, in our case, will 
depend on the presence of a chaotic attractor and not on the influence of an unintended steady state.12 
 
The mathematical underpinnings behind these results exploit the presence of a family of homoclinic 
orbits, double asymptotic to a saddle-focus, in a three-dimensional ambience. The striking complexity 
of the dynamics near these homoclinic orbits has been discovered and investigated by Shilnikov 
(1965), who has shown that, if the associated saddle quantity is positive, infinitely many saddle limit 
cycles coexist at the bifurcation point. Each of these saddle limit cycles has both stable and unstable 
manifolds, which determine high sensitivity to initial conditions and irregular transitional dynamics. To 
the best of our knowledge, the Shilnikov homoclinic bifurcation theorem, largely used in physics, 
biology, electronic circuits, chemistry and mechanical engineering, has recently found application in 
economics only in a growth theory paper (Bella, Mattana and Venturi, 2017). 
 
The fourth section of our paper discusses an innovative solution to these unfamiliar problems, if the 
 
10 Consider, for example, the case in which the policy maker runs an active fiscal-monetary regime. Assume further that a 
change in the conduct of fiscal policy induces uniqueness of the equilibrium around the intended steady state. Then, the 
policy maker may be pressured to renounce discretion in fiscal policy by committing to a marginal tax rate above the real 
interest rate.  As we show, a consequence could be Shilnikov chaos. 
 
11Cf. Farmer et al. (1983) for a classical discussion on the relevant dimensions of a chaotic attractor. 
 
12In contrast, as discussed below in Section 2, Benhabib et al. (2001 a,b) found that when the zero bound on nominal interest 
rate is explicitly taken into account, aggressive interest rate policies may lead the economy to an unintended equilibrium at a 
liquidity trap or to a limit cycle characterized by Hopf bifurcation.  The low inflation rate and low interest rate phenomenon 
arising in our research, as a consequence of density heterogeneity in the Shilnikov chaotic attractor, is disconnected from 
the liquidity trap that can emerge because of the influence of an unintended steady state, as in Benhabib et al. (2001a,b).  In 
fact, the two types of liquidity trap may even co-exist for a while, depending on the initial conditions of the economy. 
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Central Bank chooses to retain the Taylor rule and its consequent Shilnikov chaos. Specifically, we 
show that the chaotic dynamics can be controlled, in the sense of Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1986), 
henceforth OGY. Under specific conditions, the announcement of a higher nominal interest rate at the 
steady state anchors expectations to the long-run target. More generally, the long run nominal interest 
rate can be treated as an intermediate target of policy, with the instrument being one of the new policy 
instruments available, such as forward guidance or quantitative easing. Undesired irregular and cyclical 
behavior can be superseded, and the intended fixed point can be targeted and attained in a relatively 
short time. 
 
We now present the plan of the paper. The second section presents the model and the implied three-
dimensional system of first-order differential equations. We also obtain stability results for the intended 
steady state, when monetary policy is active. In the third section, we show that the three-dimensional 
dynamics, characterizing the solution of the model, can satisfy the requirements of the Shilnikov (1965) 
theorem under plausible calibration settings of the NK model. An example of chaotic dynamics is also 
discussed, along with its sensitivity to perturbations of the bifurcation parameter and the initial 
conditions. In section 4 we consider policy approaches to solving the problems produced by the 
dynamics of the economy within the Shilnikov attractor set.  We consider approaches to eliminating the 
chaos by replacing the Taylor rule by an alternative policy design without interest rate feedback.  We 
also consider approaches that retain the Taylor rule and the associated Shilnikov chaos, while 
controlling the chaos through the OGY algorithm using a second policy instrument. The conclusion 
reassesses the main findings of the paper. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider the optimization problem faced by household-firm i in the sticky-price, money-in-the utility-
function, NK model in continuous time (cf., inter al. Benhabib et al., 2001a,b; and more recently 
Tsuzuki, 2016).13  We shall call this problem Decision P. 
 
Decision P: 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 � �𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − 𝑓𝑓(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) − 𝜂𝜂2 (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋∗)2� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑∞0  
 
   subject to 
    ?̇?𝑀𝑖𝑖 = (𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑅𝑅) + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏 
    ?̇?𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 
                                       
 
13 The money in the utility function approach implicitly uses the derived utility function shown to exist by Arrow and Hahn 
(1971), if money has positive value in equilibrium.  A long literature has repeatedly confirmed this existence from models 
having various explicit motives for holding money, such as transactions or liquidity constraints (e.g., Feenstra (1986), 
Poterba and Rotemberg (1987), and Wang and Yip (1992).  Recently, in a dynamical framework, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, 
and Uribe (2001a,b;2002) have shown equivalence to a money in the production function model.   
The mapping from explicit motives for holding money to the derived utility function does not have a unique inverse.  
Hence, money in the utility function models cannot reveal the explicit motive for holding money.  But the ability to infer the 
explicit motive is not relevant to our research.  Hence, for our purposes, we can assume that money has positive value in 
equilibrium, without conditioning upon an explicit motive. 
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               𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(0) = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖0 
     𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(0) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖0 
 
 
The objective of the household-firm optimizer is to maximize the discounted sum of a net utility 
stream, where 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) measures utility derived by household-firm i from consumption of the 
composite good, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, and from real money balances, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, under the time discount rate, 𝜌𝜌. It is assumed 
that 𝑢𝑢(. , . ) is twice continuously differentiable in all its arguments and that 
 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) > 0;  𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) < 0;  𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) > 0;  𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) < 0,   (1) 
 
where the function subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
 
The function 𝑓𝑓(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) measures the disutility of labor, where 𝑓𝑓(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) is twice continuously differentiable, 
with  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 > 0 and 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 < 0 . 
 
The term 
𝜂𝜂2 (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋∗)2 is standard to account for deviations of the price change, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = ?̇?𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , with regard to 
the intended rate 𝜋𝜋∗, where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the price charged by individual 𝑖𝑖 on the good it produces, and where 
the parameter 𝜂𝜂 measures the degree to which household-firms dislike to deviate in their price-setting 
behavior from the intended rate of inflation, 𝜋𝜋∗. 
 
In the household-firm budget constraint, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 denotes real financial wealth, consisting of interest-bearing 
government bonds, where 𝑅𝑅 is the nominal interest rate and 𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) is an endowment of perishable goods, 
produced according to a production function using labor, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖, as the only input. Real lump-sum taxes are 
denoted by 𝜏𝜏. Therefore, the instantaneous budget constraint says that the change in the firm-household 
real wealth equals real interest earnings on wealth, plus disposable income net of the opportunity cost 
of holding money minus consumption expenditure. 
 
Before applying the Maximum Principle, it is important to recall that in the NK model, sales of good 𝑖𝑖 
are demand determined, 
 𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 �−𝜙𝜙 𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 ,                 (2) 
 
where 𝜙𝜙 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and 𝑝𝑝 is the aggregate price level. 
 
Taking into account (2), the discounted Hamiltonian can be set as 
 𝑯𝑯 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − 𝑓𝑓(𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)) − 𝜂𝜂
2
(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋∗)2 + 
+𝜇𝜇1 �[𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖]𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 �−𝜙𝜙 𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏� +  𝜇𝜇2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝜇𝜇1 and 𝜇𝜇2 are the costate variables; 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 are the control variables; and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 are the 
state variables. 
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The necessary first order conditions are 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − 𝜇𝜇1=0,                                                                                      (3.a) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − 𝜇𝜇1𝑅𝑅 = 0,                                                                             (3.b) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = −𝜇𝜇1𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝜂𝜂(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋∗) = 0,                                                              (3.c) ?̇?𝜇1 = 𝜌𝜌𝜇𝜇1 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝜇𝜇1 − (𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖)𝜇𝜇1,                                                                  (3.d) ?̇?𝜇2 = 𝜌𝜌𝜇𝜇2 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝜇𝜇2 + 𝑓𝑓′(𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖))𝑙𝑙′(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) − (1 − 𝜙𝜙) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)𝑝𝑝 𝜇𝜇1 − 𝜇𝜇2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖.             (3.e)  
 
Second order conditions also require 
 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) < 0,                                                                                                                  (4.a) 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) − 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)2 > 0.                                                          (4.b) 
 
Consider now a symmetric equilibrium in which all household-firm units' behaviors are based on the 
same equations. Then, recalling that in equilibrium 
 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑙),  
 
the equations from (3.a) to (3.e) allow us to derive the following three-dimensional system of 
differential equations, which we shall call System M. 
 
System M: 
 ?̇?𝜇1 = (𝜌𝜌 − 𝑅𝑅 + 𝜋𝜋)𝜇𝜇1 𝜂𝜂?̇?𝜋 = 𝜌𝜌(𝜋𝜋 − 𝜋𝜋∗)𝜂𝜂 − 𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋)�(1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋)𝜓𝜓�        
 ?̇?𝑀 = (𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋)𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋), 𝑅𝑅) − 𝜏𝜏, 
 
where the subscripts are dropped to simplify notation (cf. Tsuzuki, 2016, and Benhabib et al., 2001a,b 
for details on the derivation). The first equation denotes the time evolution of the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the continuous time budget constraint (or shadow price of the real value of aggregate 
per capita government liabilities, real balances and bonds) at instant of time t.14 The second equation is 
the well-known New Keynesian Phillips Curve. The third equation is the budget constraint at time t. 
 
 
14 Notice that in the Tsuzuki (2016) formulation of the model, there is also a term representing real government spending, 
which however is held constant. Since the term has no qualitative relevance for the results in this paper, we neglect it, in line 
with the Benhabib et al. (2001a,b) formulation. 
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Solutions of system M are admissible equilibrium paths, if the Transversality Condition (TVC) 
 
[ ]
0
( ) ( )
0 lim ( )
t
R s s ds
t
e a t
π− −
→∞=
∫
         (5) 
 
is satisfied.15  
 
We now turn our attention to the behavior of the public authorities. Following Benhabib et al. 
(2001a,b), we assume that the monetary authority adopts an interest rate policy described by the 
feedback rule, 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋).          (6) 
 
The function 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋) is continuous, strictly convex, and satisfies the following properties. 
 
Assumption 1. (Zero lower bound on nominal rates and Taylor principle). Monetary authorities set the 
nominal interest rate as an increasing function of the inflation rate, implying that 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋) > 0;      𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋) > 0; 𝑅𝑅′′(𝜋𝜋) < 0.           (7) 
 
It is further assumed that there exists an inflation rate, 𝜋𝜋∗, at which the following steady-state Fisher 
equation is satisfied: 
 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋∗) = ?̄?𝑅.                        (8) 
 
Consider, moreover, the following definition (cf. Benhabib et al., 2001a,b). 
 
Definition 1. Let 𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋) > 1. Then the policy maker reacts more than proportionally to an increase in 
the inflation rate (active monetary policy). If, conversely, 𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋) < 1, the policy maker reacts less than 
proportionally to an increase in the inflation rate (monetary policy is passive). 
 
Let us now turn our attention to fiscal policy. We assume that taxes are tuned according to fluctuations 
in total real government liabilities, a, so that 
 𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏(𝑀𝑀).            (9) 
 
Similarly, for monetary policy, it is further assumed that there exists a tax rate corresponding to the 
steady-state state level of real government liabilities 
 𝜏𝜏(𝑀𝑀∗) = ?̄?𝜏.          (10) 
 
As in Leeper (1991), Woodford (2003), and Kumhof et al. (2010), we provide a definition of the fiscal 
 
15 Notice that, in the present context, the TVC consists of a borrowing limit, preventing households from engaging in Ponzi 
games. 
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policy stance. Let us consider the responses of 𝑀𝑀 to its own variations. We have 
 𝜕𝜕?̇?𝑎𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋) − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀).        (11) 
 
The dynamic path of total government liabilities is locally stable or unstable, according to the 
magnitude of the marginal tax rate, 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀). Therefore, we have the following useful definition. 
 
Definition 2. Let 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀) > 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋) − 𝜋𝜋. Then, since the dynamic path of total government liabilities is 
stable, fiscal policy is passive. Let 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀) < 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋) − 𝜋𝜋 . Then the dynamic path of total government 
liabilities is unstable, and the fiscal policy is of active type. 
 
Notice that adopting a passive fiscal policy is tantamount to committing to fiscal solvency under all 
circumstances. 
 
2.1. Steady states and local stability properties 
 
The long-run properties of system M are well understood. Benhabib et al. (2001a,b) show that if 
Assumption 1 holds, then, in general, two steady states exist: one where inflation is at the intended rate 𝜋𝜋 = 𝜋𝜋∗ and one where 𝜋𝜋 = ?̄?𝜋 ≠ 𝜋𝜋∗.16 The unintended steady-state is labelled as a liquidity trap, in 
which the interest rate is zero or near-zero, and inflation is below the target level and possibly negative. 
Moreover, at the steady-state where inflation is at the intended rate, 𝜋𝜋 = 𝜋𝜋∗, it follows that 𝜇𝜇1∗ exists 
and is unique. 
 
The local stability properties around the intended steady-state are also well described in the literature. 
A complete picture is provided in Tsuzuki (2016), where the following are clear. 
 
1. When monetary policy is passive, an active fiscal policy induces uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
Conversely, a passive fiscal policy commitment to preserve fiscal solvency under all circumstances 
leads to an indeterminate equilibrium. 
 
2. When monetary policy is active, the stability properties are more mixed. Using the steady state 
degree of complementarity/substitutability between money and consumption in the utility function, 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ ,  to characterize the results, we have the following. 
  
 2a. When money and consumption are Edgeworth complements in the utility function (𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ > 0), 
the combination of an active monetary policy regime with a passive fiscal rule still induces 
uniqueness of the equilibrium. Conversely, no equilibria exist in the neighborhood of the steady 
state in the case of an active fiscal policy. 
 
 2b. When money and consumption are Edgeworth substitutes in the utility function (𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ < 0), 
there exists a critical threshold,  
 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ ,       (12) 
 
16 Notice that, as discussed by Benhabib et al. (2001a,b), if monetary policy is active according to Definition 1, then  ?̄?𝜋 <𝜋𝜋∗, and the low-inflation equilibrium can be interpreted as a liquidity trap. 
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such that if |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | < |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ |, then the same consequence as in (2a) occurs. Conversely, when |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | >
|𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ |, full stability of the intended steady state is established, when fiscal rule is passive, while 
indeterminacy of the equilibrium prevails, when fiscal policy is active.  
 
For the sake of a clear discussion of the main point of this paper, we shall assume the following. 
 
Assumption 2. Money and consumption are Edgeworth substitutes in the utility function, i.e. 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ <
0.17 
 
Let  𝑃𝑃∗ ≡ (𝜇𝜇1∗, 𝜋𝜋∗, 𝑀𝑀∗) denote the values of (𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋, 𝑀𝑀) such that ?̇?𝜇1 = ?̇?𝜋 = ?̇?𝑀 = 0, with  
 𝜇𝜇1∗ = 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 − 1 𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1∗, 𝜋𝜋∗)𝜓𝜓 𝜋𝜋∗ = ?̄?𝑅 − 𝜌𝜌, 𝑀𝑀∗ = ?̄?𝑅𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1∗, 𝜋𝜋∗), ?̄?𝑅) + ?̄?𝜏𝜌𝜌 , 
defined as the intended steady state. Then, we prove the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. (Local stability properties of the intended steady state under Assumption 2). Recall 
Assumption 2. Assume monetary policy is active. Then two stability cases can occur according to the 
magnitude of |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ |. Consider, first, the case, |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | < |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ |. If fiscal policy is also active, 𝑃𝑃∗ is a 
repellor and there are no equilibrium paths besides the steady-state itself. If fiscal policy is passive, 𝑃𝑃∗ 
is a saddle of index 2, and the equilibrium is locally unique. Consider now the case,  |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | > |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ |. If 
fiscal policy is passive, 𝑃𝑃∗ is an attractor, whereas when fiscal policy is active, there is a continuum of 
equilibria that converge to the steady-state (local indeterminacy). 
 
Proof. These results are obtained by applying the Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion to system M, 
evaluated at the steady state. Cf. Appendix 1.  ∎ 
 
 
17 We are looking for parameter combinations such that system M possesses a hyperbolic, saddle-focus equilibrium point. 
Therefore, both cases (2.a) and (2.b) are possible candidates. However, as will become clearer later on in the paper, it is 
more convenient to spotlight the (2.b) case, where the saddle-focus may bifurcate into a fully stable equilibrium point. The 
economic implications of a negative 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 are well represented in Walsh (2010) for the general case of the utility function 
with non-zero interdependences between leisure, money, and consumption. Specifically, if 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 < 0, a monetary injection 
that raises expected inflation will increase consumption, labor supply, and output, a situation described as an “asset 
substitution model” by Wang and Yip (1992). 
Since Edgeworth substitutability is a cardinal property, it is not econometrically testable.  But closely related Morishima 
substitutability is ordinal and has been tested by Serletis and Xu (2019).  They found (see their figure 11, p. 21) that 
consumer goods have consistently been net Morishima substitutes for monetary services throughout their sample period, 
beginning in 1967, but gross complements because of positive income effects. Since income effects are not relevant to 
Edgeworth substitutability, the finding of net Morishima substitutability is more relevant to our assumption. Consumer 
goods might be both net and gross substitutes for monetary services, if monetary services are augmented to include credit 
card services, as available with the Divisia monetary aggregates supplied by the Center for Financial Stability. Increased 
consumption is associated with increased use of credit cards. 
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3. Shilnikov chaos 
 
Let us now focus on the case, |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | < |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ |. Consider a scenario where the policy-maker runs an 
active fiscal-monetary regime. Then, by Proposition 1, the policy maker may be pressured to increase 
the marginal tax rate above the real interest rate. In this Section, we show that following this policy 
prescription may induce another class of difficulties. 
 
3.1. An explicit variant of the model 
 
Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to provide specific forms for the implicit functions 
presented in system M. Following the standard literature, we first assume that the utility function has 
constant relative risk aversion in a composite good, which in turn is produced with consumption goods 
and real balances via a CES aggregator as follows: 
 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑚𝑚) = �𝜅𝜅𝑐𝑐1−𝛽𝛽+(1−𝜅𝜅)𝑚𝑚1−𝛽𝛽�1−𝛷𝛷1−𝛽𝛽1−𝛷𝛷 ,     (13) 
 
where 0 < 𝜅𝜅 < 1 is a share parameter, 𝛽𝛽 measures the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between 
the two arguments, 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑚𝑚, and  𝛷𝛷 > 0  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
Since we have, for now, assumed that consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth substitutes, 
the following parametric restriction is implied. 
 
Remark 1. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ ) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝛽𝛽 − Φ) . Therefore, Assumption 2 requires 𝛽𝛽 < Φ.18 
 
Moreover, it is standard to assume that the disutility of labor is captured by the following functional 
form 
 𝑓𝑓(𝑙𝑙) = 𝑙𝑙1+𝜓𝜓1+𝜓𝜓,         (14) 
 
where 𝜓𝜓 > 0 measures the preference weight of leisure in utility. 
  
Furthermore, following Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) and more recently Tsuzuki (2016), we also 
assume that production is linear in labor, 
 𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑙) = 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙,       (15) 
 
where A denotes the productivity level in the composite goods production. Without loss of generality, 
we will also set 𝐴𝐴 = 1.19 
 
 
18 Cf. Walsh (2010), p. 72, for an extensive discussion of the economic interpretation of this restriction. 
 
19 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) make the same assumption. 
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Additionally, we use the specification of the Taylor principle in Benhabib et al. (2001a,b), and assume 
that monetary authorities observe the inflation rate and conduct market operations to ensure that 
 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋) = ?̄?𝑅𝑒𝑒(𝐶𝐶/?̄?𝑅)(𝜋𝜋−𝜋𝜋∗),       (16) 
 
where C is a positive constant. Notice that, from (6), our chosen functional form implies 
 𝑅𝑅(𝜋𝜋∗) = ?̄?𝑅;     𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋∗) = 𝐶𝐶.       (17) 
 
Finally, in order to avoid violating the Transversality Condition, we assume that the economy satisfies 
a Ricardian monetary-fiscal regime. More specifically, equation (16) is complemented by the fiscal rule 
 𝜏𝜏(𝑀𝑀) = 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,       (18) 
 
where the marginal tax rate 𝛼𝛼 ≡ 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀) is a positive constant. 
 
3.2. Conditions for the existence of Shilnikov chaos 
 
In this section, we provide the mathematical underpinnings that guarantee the existence of a chaotic 
regime in system M. Consider the following Theorem (Chen and Zhou, 2011), which is a generalized 
version of the original result of Shilnikov (1965).  
 
 
Theorem 1. Consider the dynamic system 
 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑, 𝛼𝛼),   𝑑𝑑 ∈ ℝ3,   𝛼𝛼 ∈ ℝ1, 
 
with f sufficiently smooth. Assume f has a hyperbolic saddle-focus equilibrium point, 𝑑𝑑0 = 0, at 𝛼𝛼 = 0, 
implying that eigenvalues of the Jacobian, 𝐽𝐽 = 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓,  are of the form 𝛾𝛾 and  𝜒𝜒 ± 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖, where 𝛾𝛾, 𝜒𝜒, and 𝜉𝜉 
are real constants with 𝛾𝛾𝜒𝜒 < 0 . Assume that the following conditions also hold: 
 
 (𝜕𝜕. 1)  The saddle quantity,  𝜎𝜎 ≡ |𝛾𝛾| − |𝜒𝜒| > 0;  
 (𝜕𝜕. 2)  There exists a homoclinic orbit, 𝛤𝛤0, based at  𝑑𝑑0. 
 
Then the following results hold: 
 
(1)  The Shilnikov map, defined in the neighborhood of the homoclinic orbit of the system, possesses an 
infinite number of Smale horseshoes in its discrete dynamics;   
 
(2)  For any sufficiently small 𝐶𝐶1-perturbation, 𝑆𝑆, of 𝑓𝑓, the perturbed system has at least a finite 
number of Smale horseshoes in the discrete dynamics of the Shilnikov map, defined in the 
neighborhood of the homoclinic orbit;   
 
(3)  Both the original and the perturbed system exhibit horseshoes chaos. 
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The application of Theorem 1 to system M requires that several conditions be fulfilled, gradually 
restricting the relevant parameter space. Specifically, we need  the parameters to be such that: (i) the 
system possesses a hyperbolic saddle-focus equilibrium point; (ii) in the case of the saddle-focus 
equilibrium, the saddle quantity is positive; and (iii) in the case of the saddle-focus equilibrium, with 
positive saddle quantity, there exists a homoclinic orbit connecting the saddle-focus to itself. System M 
is highly non-linear and heavily parametrized.  
 
Our attempts to obtain a general result on the critical parametric bifurcation surfaces have been 
frustrated by frequent numerical anomalies. In order to show that there are regions in the parameter 
space such that system M may satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1, we therefore propose a numerical 
strategy based on the parametrization of the US economy for the period 1960(Q1) to 1998(Q3), 
proposed by Benhabib et al. (2001a,b) and extensively used in the succeeding literature (cf. Tsuzuki, 
2016, for a recent application). 
 
 Example 1. Denote the set of the deep parameters as 𝐃𝐃 ≡ (𝛽𝛽, 𝜂𝜂, 𝜅𝜅, 𝜙𝜙, 𝜓𝜓, 𝜌𝜌, 𝛷𝛷), and assume 
 ?̄?𝐃 ≡ (1.975,350,0.90899,21,1,0.018,2) ∈ 𝐃𝐃.  
 
Set furthermore the pair (?̄?𝑅, 𝜋𝜋∗) = (0.06,0.042) to match the (average) three-month Treasury Bill rate 
and (average) inflation rate observed over the period for the US economy. Therefore, since 𝜏𝜏 cancels 
out in the calculations, the characteristic equation (A.2 in Appendix 1) is a function of the remaining 
policy parameters, C and 𝜏𝜏′. Solving the characteristic equation gives 
 𝜆𝜆1 = 0.018 − 𝜏𝜏′, 𝜆𝜆2,3 = 0.009 − 0.00058𝐶𝐶 ± 0.00058�(𝐶𝐶 − 1.00046)(𝐶𝐶 − 4.6543 × 105). 
 
Therefore, since |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | ≅ 0.0008 < |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ | ≅ 15.7812 according to Proposition 1, an active monetary-
fiscal regime implies three eigenvalues with positive real parts for any reasonable value of the 
coefficient C. A fiscal policy switch to a passive rule implies one negative eigenvalue and two 
eigenvalues with positive real parts. In this example, the saddle quantity equals 
 𝜎𝜎 ≡ 𝜏𝜏′ − 0.027 + 0.00058𝐶𝐶.            (19) 
 
Therefore, if we set  𝜏𝜏′ > 0.027 − 0.00058𝐶𝐶, the saddle quantity is positive. 
 
We are now ready to propose the following result. 
 
 Lemma 1. (Fulfillment of pre-condition H.1 in Theorem 1). There are regions of the parameter space 
where the intended steady-state, 𝑃𝑃∗, is a saddle-focus equilibrium with 𝜎𝜎 > 0 . 
 
Proof. Set 𝐶𝐶 > 1.00046 and 𝜏𝜏′ > 0.027 − 0.00058𝐶𝐶 as in Example 1. Then, the eigenvalues 
associated with system M are of the form required for 𝑃𝑃∗ to be a saddle-focus equilibrium with 𝜎𝜎 > 0.  ∎ 
 
14 
 
 
In order to verify the robustness of the results in Lemma 1 to changes in the parameters, we conducted 
some further numerical simulations. First, we obtained a more general form of the eigenvalues by 
relaxing the parameters one-by-one from the set 𝐃𝐃 ≡ (𝛽𝛽, 𝜂𝜂, 𝜅𝜅, 𝜙𝜙, 𝜓𝜓, 𝜌𝜌, 𝛷𝛷). Results, not reported but 
available upon request, indicate that there is always a small range of the parameter C above unity, for 
which eigenvalues are all real and there exist values of the marginal tax rate, such that 𝜎𝜎 > 0. 
 
Furthermore, we kept 𝐃𝐃 = ?̄?𝐃, took 𝜋𝜋∗ = 0.042, and studied the surface 
 𝛀𝛀 ≡ 𝐁𝐁(𝐉𝐉) + 𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓(𝐉𝐉)𝟐𝟐 
 
in the remaining (𝐶𝐶, ?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) parameter space. As shown in Bella, Mattana and Venturi (2017), the 
vanishing of 𝛀𝛀 corresponds to the critical parametric surface at which a generic steady state is a saddle-
focus equilibrium with null saddle quantity. 
 
Figure 1. Combinations of the (𝐶𝐶, ?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) parameters at which 𝑃𝑃∗ is a saddle-focus with 𝜎𝜎 = 0. 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the parametric surface in the (𝐶𝐶, ?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) space such that 𝑃𝑃∗ is a saddle-focus equilibrium 
at the bifurcation point 𝜎𝜎 = 0. Above the surface, the saddle quantity is positive. Below the surface, the 
saddle quantity is negative. Interestingly, the figure shows that a positive saddle quantity can be 
determined exactly, when the pair (?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) is plausibly low and 𝐶𝐶 > 1. 
 
We end this section by noticing some further details regarding the form of the eigenvalues in Example 
1. It is clear that, for 𝐶𝐶 > 1.00046, and irrespective of the stance of fiscal policy, one eigenvalue is 
real, and the remaining two eigenvalues are complex conjugate. This means that locally, when 
monetary policy is active, convergence towards 𝑃𝑃∗ occurs typically through (damped) oscillating 
paths.20 It is also useful to observe the following. 
 
Remark 2. In our simulations, the structure of the eigenvalues derived in Example 1 survives wide 
variations of the parameters. More specifically, when C > 1 (active monetary policy), there is always a 
 
20 It would be interesting here to confront the dynamics featured by these equilibria with the “volatile sequence of interest 
rates and inflation rates followed by sudden arrival at the low nominal interest rate steady state,” pointed out by Bullard 
(2010, p. 344), regarding complicated or chaotic expectational dynamics. On that issue, see also Piazza (2016). 
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small right neighborhood of C = 1 such that eigenvalues are all real. Things are different when C < 1 
(passive monetary policy). In this case, eigenvalues are always real, and the convergence towards 𝑃𝑃∗generally takes place along the monotonic perfect-foresight path. 
 
Once it has been established that there are regions in the parameter space such that 𝑃𝑃∗ is a saddle-focus 
equilibrium with  𝜎𝜎 > 0 , we need to show that system M admits homoclinic solutions (pre-condition 
H.2 in Theorem 1). Bella, Mattana and Venturi (2017) describe in detail the necessary steps required to 
establish whether a given dynamical system supports the existence of a family of homoclinic orbits 
doubly asymptotic to a saddle-focus in ℝ3. The application of the method is very lengthy. Because of 
the space constraint, we do not report those computations, which remain available upon request. For 
details, please refer to Bella, Mattana and Venturi (2017). 
 
A preliminary step requires translation of the system, M, to the origin and putting the system into 
normal form by using the associated eigenbasis. We thereby obtain the following (truncated) normal 
form of system, M,  
 �?̇?𝑤1?̇?𝑤2?̇?𝑤3� = �𝜒𝜒 −𝜉𝜉 0𝜉𝜉 𝜒𝜒 00 0 𝛾𝛾� �𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤2𝑤𝑤3� +                           
+ �𝐹𝐹1𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤2  + 𝐹𝐹1𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤3  + 𝐹𝐹1𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤2𝑤𝑤3  + 𝐹𝐹1𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤12 + 𝐹𝐹1𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤22 + 𝐹𝐹1𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤32𝐹𝐹2𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤2  + 𝐹𝐹2𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤3  + 𝐹𝐹2𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤2𝑤𝑤3  + 𝐹𝐹2𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤12 + 𝐹𝐹2𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤22 + 𝐹𝐹2𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤32𝐹𝐹3𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤2  + 𝐹𝐹3𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤3  + 𝐹𝐹3𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤2𝑤𝑤3  + 𝐹𝐹3𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤12 + 𝐹𝐹3𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤22 + 𝐹𝐹3𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤32� , (20) 
 
where (𝑤𝑤1, 𝑤𝑤2, 𝑤𝑤3)𝑇𝑇 is the vector of transformed coordinates, and where the 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 coefficients, with  𝑖𝑖 =
1,2,3 and 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝑏𝑏. . . 𝑓𝑓, are combinations of the original parameters of the model, also depending on the 
values of three free constants, 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3 arising in the computation of the eigenbasis. Following 
Freire et al. (2002), system (20) can be put into the hypernormal (truncated) form 
 
  �?̇?𝑤1?̇?𝑤2?̇?𝑤3� = � 0 1 00 0 1𝜀𝜀1 𝜀𝜀2 𝜀𝜀3� �𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤2𝑤𝑤3� + � 00𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤12 + 𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤13�,   (21)  
 
where  𝜀𝜀1 = −𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃(𝐉𝐉) , 𝜀𝜀2 = 𝐁𝐁(𝐉𝐉), 𝜀𝜀3 = −𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓(𝐉𝐉) , and where d and k are combinations of various 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 
coefficients. 
 
Once the hypernormal form has been obtained, the method of undetermined coefficients (Shang and 
Han, 2005) is applied to obtain a polynomial approximation of the analytical expressions of both the 
two-dimensional unstable manifolds associated with 𝜆𝜆2 and 𝜆𝜆3, and of the one-dimensional stable 
manifold associated with 𝜆𝜆1. The procedure leads to the following split function21 
 
  𝛴𝛴 = 𝛯𝛯 + 𝐹𝐹3𝑓𝑓𝛯𝛯2𝛾𝛾 + (2𝜒𝜒 − 𝛾𝛾) 𝐹𝐹3𝑎𝑎𝛹𝛹𝛹𝛹+𝐹𝐹3𝑑𝑑𝛹𝛹2+𝐹𝐹3𝑒𝑒𝛹𝛹2(2𝜒𝜒−𝛾𝛾)2+4𝜉𝜉2 = 0,      (22) 
 
21 Cf. Kuznetsov (1998, p. 198) for the geometrical interpretation of the split function in the context of homoclinic 
bifurcations. 
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where  (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) ∈ (0,1)3 are free constants, while 𝛾𝛾 = 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜒𝜒 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒( 𝜆𝜆2,3), and 𝜉𝜉 = 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚( 𝜆𝜆2,3). Then, 
with given parameters, conditions for the existence of the homoclinic loop, doubly asymptotic to the 
saddle-focus equilibrium point, rely on the existence of a triplet (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) ∈ (0,1)3 satisfying 𝛴𝛴 = 0 
(admissible solution).22 
 
To verify whether there are admissible solutions to (22) in the feasible parameter space, we specify 
further the calibration of the economy used in this section. 
 
Example 2. Let 𝐃𝐃 = ?̄?𝐃 and (?̄?𝑅, 𝜋𝜋∗) = (0.06,0.042), as in Example 1. Set = 1.5 . By (19), the critical 
value of the marginal tax rate at which the saddle quantity is positive is 
 ?̃?𝜏′ = 0.027 − 0.00058𝐶𝐶 = 0.02613.  
 
If  𝜏𝜏′ > ?̃?𝜏′ , then 𝑃𝑃∗ is a saddle-focus with positive saddle quantity. Let us now use the marginal tax 
rate, 𝜏𝜏′, as the bifurcation parameter. More precisely, we iteratively increase 𝜏𝜏′ above 0.02613 with a 
grid of  0.01 until a solution for 𝛴𝛴 = 0 with (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) ∈ (0,1)3 emerges. The procedure reveals that 
there exists an interval 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′ ≅ (0.02613,0.23543) such that, for all 𝜏𝜏′ ∈ 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′, a family of homoclinic 
loops doubly asymptotic to the saddle-focus equilibrium point exists.23 
 
Figure 2 depicts the combinations of the (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) constants solving the split function (22) for the case 
of 𝜏𝜏′ = 0.15. 
 
Figure 2. Coordinates in the (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 giving rise to the homoclinic loop for τ′ = 0.15.  
 
22 The reason why the three constants (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) are bound to belong to the cube (0,1)3 is strictly related to the geometry of 
the stable and unstable manifolds which intersect near the origin (in the transformed eigenspace) and forms the homoclinic 
loop. The issue is well identified in Kuznetsov (1998, p. 259). 
 
23 In order to identify the monetary policy and fiscal policy regimes that prevailed in the US,  Bhattarai et al. (2012) 
considered 90 percent prior probability interval for the parameter C to be (1.189, 1.811) under active monetary policy 
regimes and for marginal tax rates to be (0.003, 0.107) under passive fiscal policy regimes in their calibrations. The 
intervals cover the range of values found in the literature (e.g., Davig and Leeper (2011), Xu and Serletis (2016), Ascari et. 
al. (2017) etc.).Using more recent US data with a superior policy rule that incorporates time varying disturbance variances 
in interest rate rules, Xu and Serletis (2015) found parameter C = 1.655 and marginal tax rate 𝜏𝜏′ = 0.017 under the active-
passive monetary-fiscal regime. However, note that the extent to which the marginal tax rate can be revised upwards 
depends on where the economy is located on its Laffer curve and the political resistance to higher taxes on the economy. 
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Remark 3.  For this calibration of the economy, since 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏′ > 0 for all values of (𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) ∈ (0,1)3, 
there exists a unique critical value of 𝜏𝜏 ′solving the split function (22). 
 
The following statement is therefore implied. 
 
Lemma 2. (Fulfillment of pre-condition H.2 in Theorem 1). There exists regions in the parameter 
space such that pre-conditions H.1 and H.2 in Theorem 1 are simultaneously satisfied. 
 
Lemma 2 is an important result. It states that, if the parameters are accurately chosen, then a family of 
homoclinic connections is established, leading from the intended steady state to itself in backward and 
forward time. 
 
Without showing the computations, we also point out the following. 
 
Remark 4. Alternative calibrations of the economy show that the result is qualitatively robust. 
 
3.3. Existence and properties of the chaotic attractor 
 
We can now go to the main result in this section. Let 𝜈𝜈 = 𝜏𝜏′ − ?̄?𝜏′, where  ?̄?𝜏′ ∈ 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′ is the critical value of 
the marginal tax rate, such that an admissible solution of the split function exists for given coordinates, 
(𝛯𝛯, 𝛹𝛹, 𝛺𝛺) ∈ (0,1)3. Let 𝑉𝑉 ⊂ ℝ be a small open neighborhood of 0. We have the following result. 
Proposition 2. (Existence of a Shilnikov chaotic attractor) Assume that the parametric conditions in 
Lemmas 1 and 2 are satisfied. Let 𝜈𝜈 ∈ 𝑉𝑉. Then, given a triplet of initial conditions, 
(𝑤𝑤1(0), 𝑤𝑤2(0), 𝑤𝑤3(0)),  sufficiently close to the origin, system (21) admits perfect-foresight chaotic 
equilibrium solution. By topological equivalence, the result also applies to system M. 
 
Proof. See Appendix 2.  ∎ 
 
Consider now the following Example. 
 
Example 3. Set 𝐃𝐃 = ?̄?𝐃, (?̄?𝑅, 𝜋𝜋∗) = (0.06,0.042), and  𝐶𝐶 = 1.5, as in Example 2. Then, we know that 
there exists 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′ ≅ (0.02613,0.23543) such that for all 𝜏𝜏′ ∈ 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′ there exists a family of homoclinic 
loops doubly asymptotic to the saddle-focus equilibrium point. Consider the case of 𝜏𝜏′ = 0.15 and 
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initial conditions  (𝑤𝑤1(0), 𝑤𝑤2 (0), 𝑤𝑤3(0)) = (−0.01, −0.01, −0.01).  
 
The attractor generated by this specific example is represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. The chaotic attractor in the (𝑤𝑤1, 𝑤𝑤2 , 𝑤𝑤3) space.  
 
 
Figure 3 displays the distinct shape of the Shilnikov attractor. The dynamics of the economy along the 
spiral attractor have periods of relative quiescence, when the phase point approaches the saddle-focus 
point. Conversely, when the phase point starts to spiral away from the saddle-focus point, there is the 
onset of irregular episodes of oscillatory activity.24 More details on the characteristics of the time 
profiles of the variables, when the economy evolves along the chaotic attractor, are provided in the next 
sections.  
 
3.4. Economic implications 
 
Economic implications of Proposition 2 are very important to the dynamics implied by NK models. 
The existence of a chaotic attractor implies that small changes in initial conditions can produce large 
changes in dynamics over time. Two economies, starting contiguously in the space of initial conditions, 
 
24  Is the chaotic attractor in Figure 3 a global absorbing set in which trajectories fall over time for any initial data, or does 
the considered attractor have only a bounded basin of attraction? A way to answer these questions is to follow Bella, 
Mattana, and Venturi (2017) and perform a numerical scanning of the initial conditions space in which the attractor is 
observed. However, since initial conditions are given in the transformed eigenspace (𝑤𝑤1(0), 𝑤𝑤2(0), 𝑤𝑤3(0)), and since it is 
interesting to understand the boundaries of the basin of attraction in the original (𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋, 𝑀𝑀) coordinates, we retrace the 
transformation matrix for the case of parameters as in Example 3.  If we consider inflation, we have 
 𝜋𝜋(0) = 𝜋𝜋∗ −  0.00876𝑤𝑤1(0)−0.18366𝑤𝑤2(0)250        
 
where the weights in the formula depend on the structure of the chosen eigenvectors. Applying the iterative procedure, and 
starting from the vector (𝑤𝑤1(0), 𝑤𝑤2 (0), 𝑤𝑤3(0)) = (−0.01, −0.01, −0.01) in Example 3, we find that the attractor survives 
any variation of 𝜋𝜋(0) ∈ (0.0351,0.0437). This means that any perfect foresight path originating in this interval for 
inflation, is captured by the chaotic attractor. Notice that, these findings imply that the region of the phase space around the 
homoclinic orbit, which also belongs to the basin of attraction of the chaotic set, is very narrow. Therefore, as is customary 
in the literature discussing the characteristics of Shilnikov chaos, it suffices for a small perturbation of the system to make 
the attractor disappear.  
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can follow completely different patterns over time. Since an initial condition is known only to a finite 
degree of precision, it is impossible to predict dynamics deterministically over extended periods of 
time. 
 
Moreover, within a chaotic attractor, given the initial value of the predetermined variable, there exists a 
continuum of initial values of the jump variables giving rise to admissible equilibria. Therefore, the 
policy options required to recover the uniqueness suggested by the local analysis are exactly those 
which may cause global indeterminacy of the equilibrium. In this regard, showing that the equilibrium 
is globally indeterminate requires the proof that, given an initial condition in terms of the 
predetermined state variable, 𝑀𝑀(0), there exist multiple choices of the jump variables, 𝜇𝜇1(0) and 𝜋𝜋(0), 
lying outside the small neighborhood relevant to the local analysis. Our analysis is able to give rise to 
recurrent equilibria, namely solution trajectories of system M that stay in a fixed tubular neighborhood 
of a given homoclinic orbit for all times.  
 
Let 
 𝜈𝜈ℎ = {𝜈𝜈 ∈ 𝑉𝑉:   𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠}. 
 
Then, if 𝜈𝜈 ∈ 𝜈𝜈ℎ, there exists an 𝜀𝜀 − tubular neighborhood of the homoclinic orbit, such that system M 
exhibits horseshoe chaos. Let us now denote by 𝑇𝑇𝜈𝜈 ⊂ ℝ3 the set of all points of this 𝜀𝜀-tubular 
neighborhood, with Int 𝑇𝑇𝜈𝜈  and Bd 𝑇𝑇𝜈𝜈  as the set of all interior and boundary points of 𝑇𝑇𝜈𝜈, respectively.  
 
Let  𝐸𝐸𝜈𝜈 = {(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋, 𝑀𝑀) ∈ ℝ3: (𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋, 𝑀𝑀) ∈ IntT𝜈𝜈} 
 
be a three-dimensional manifold containing the set of all possible paths starting on Int 𝑇𝑇𝜈𝜈. Then, by 
Theorem 1, all paths starting on the (compact) set 𝐸𝐸𝜈𝜈 are recurrent paths, bound to stay forever in 𝐸𝐸𝜈𝜈.  
 
Consider therefore the following result. 
 
Corollary 1. (Global indeterminacy of the equilibrium). Assume that the dynamics generated by the 
flow of system M are of the type discussed in Proposition 2. Let furthermore  𝜈𝜈 ∈ 𝜈𝜈ℎ . Consider an 
initial value 𝑀𝑀(0) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝜈𝜈. Then, the NK model exhibits global indeterminacy of the equilibrium. 25∎ 
 
Proof. See Appendix 3.  ∎  
 
Finally, the qualitative “dimensions” of the chaotic attractor are of particular interest in the present 
 
25 Barnett and Duzhak (2008, 2010, 2019) found Hopf bifurcation boundaries and Period Doubling (Flip) bifurcation 
boundaries in discrete time NK models. Benhabib et al. (2001a,b) and Tsuzuki (2016) located the Hopf bifurcation 
boundary in the continuous time version of the NK model.  These bifurcation boundaries in the NK model parameter space 
represent different qualitative dynamics within the class of such models. Bifurcation boundaries are in fact commonly found 
in the parameter spaces of all credible macroeconomic models, such as optimal growth models and overlapping generations 
models. See, e.g., Grandmont (1985), Geweke, Barnett and Shell (1989), Barnett and Chen (2015); Barnett and Ghosh 
(2014); and Bella, Mattana and Venturi, (2017). 
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context.26 Assume that the relative frequency at which an orbit visits different regions of the attractor is 
largely heterogeneous. Then, across the volume of all possible coordinates contained in the attractor, 
the economy lingers on particular regions with higher “density.” In the numerical simulations 
developed in the paper, it is evident that if the initial conditions of the jump variables are chosen far 
enough from the target steady-state, then the emerging aperiodic dynamics tend to evolve for a long 
time around lower-than-targeted inflation and nominal interest rates. This can be interpreted as a 
liquidity trap phenomenon, which now depends on the existence of a chaotic attractor and not on the 
influence of an unintended steady state.  
 
Consider the reconstructed time profile of the inflation rate (Figure 4a). The time span is 10 years. 
First, observe the distinct shape of Shilnikov chaos. The wave train generated by the spiral attractor has 
long quiescence periods, when the phase point approaches the saddle-focus, followed by bursts of 
oscillatory activity. The average inflation rate can be persistently higher/lower than the steady-state 
value. This implies the possibility of long periods, during which inflation is stubbornly high, or long 
periods during which inflation is stubbornly low (akin to a deflationary equilibrium), and periods 
during which inflation is volatile. 
 
Figure 4a. The time profile of the chaotic inflation rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
26Cf. Farmer et al. (1983) for a classical discussion on the relevant dimensions of a chaotic attractor. 
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Figure 4b. The moving average of the chaotic inflation rate (window = 100 iterations).  
 
 
The relevance of periods of persistently low inflation rates is strengthened by a further phenomenon. 
The time profile for inflation shows a slight negative drift.27 Consider in particular Figure 4b, depicting 
the moving average of the inflation rate (window = 100 iterations), which we detrend using the steady 
state value of 0.042. The figure reveals a robust and persistent downward deviation of the moving 
average from the (de-trended) target inflation rate. 
 
These empirical characteristics of the dynamic pattern imply the following statement. 
 
 Corollary 2. (The existence of persistent inflationary/deflationary perfect-foresight equilibrium paths). 
Assume that the dynamics of the system evolve along the attractor set. Then, persistently high/low 
inflation rates with regard to the (unique) steady-state value can emerge.28 
 
Corollary 2 has important implications for the debate regarding liquidity traps. As discussed in our 
introduction, this phenomenon has previously been linked mainly to the existence of a low-inflation 
steady state (cf., in particular, Benhabib et al., 2001a,b) and to its basin of attraction. We offer an 
alternative explanation, based on the long-run peculiarities of a chaotic attractor and the evolution of 
the dynamics within that attractor set, such that the economy drifts into the liquidity trap without any 
policy intent.29 
 
27 We see that, in the very long-run, the dynamics of the inflation rate, in this numerical experiment, settle down to irregular 
dynamics, not centered on the coordinates of the saddle-focus.  
 
28 Notice that the eigenvalues can be chosen such that inflation can also be persistently negative. 
 
29 Notice that Corollary 2 is based on the empirical observation of the time profile of inflation. However, to provide more 
formal arguments, we have also computed the generalized Hurst exponent (Hq) for the inflation time series implied by the 
chaotic attractor emerging from Example 3 (cf. inter al. Peters (1991) for the related formula). The exponent, directly 
related to the fractal dimension, is a measure of “mild” or “wild” randomness of the data series. It quantifies the relative 
tendency of a time series either to regress strongly to the mean, or to cluster in a direction. When 0.5 < Hq < 1, we have 
evidence of a time series with long-term positive autocorrelation, such that a high value in the series will probably be 
followed by another high value, and values far into the future will also tend to be high. Conversely, when 0 < Hq < 0.5, we 
have evidence that a single high value will probably be followed by a low value, and the value after that will tend also to be 
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The differences in the qualitative dynamics arising because of an unintended steady state or because of 
the existence of a chaotic attractor are remarkable. The time profile for inflation featured in Benhabib 
et al., (2001a,b) for the case of 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 < 0, so that consumption and real balances are substitutes, presents 
higher and higher amplitude oscillations around the active steady. Then inflation suddenly arrives to 
the passive (lower) steady state value, when the saddle connection is established. This kind of 
predictable/regular behavior of the economy could be traced out by an econometric exercise. In our 
case, inflation, along the spiral attractor, has long quiescence periods, possibly characterized by a 
persistent and steep monotonic behavior, followed by bursts of irregular oscillatory activity.  
 
This kind of pattern is largely unpredictable and cannot be inferred by conventional econometric tools, 
since such behavior violates the regularity conditions for available statistical inference methodologies, 
such as the usually assumed properties of the likelihood function and polyspectra (see, e.g., Barnett, 
Gallant, Hinich, Jungeilges, Kaplan, and Jensen (1997) and Geweke (1992)). 
 
As a check on the robustness of our conclusions to our assumption of money in the utility function, we 
repeat our analysis of appearance of Shilnikov chaos to the alternative specification of money in the 
production function in Appendix 6. 
 
4. Policy solutions 
 
4.1. Ending the chaos 
 
Potential policy solutions to the problems produced by Shilnikov chaos can be divided into two groups.  
One group of approaches ends the Shilnikov chaos by removing the Taylor rule and its closed-loop 
interest rate feedback dynamics, while introducing a fundamentally different monetary policy design.  
The other approach is to retain the imposed Taylor principle and thereby the Shilnikov chaos, while 
imposing an algorithm to control the chaos.  This latter approach requires introduction of a second 
policy instrument in addition to the interest rate that appears in the Taylor rule. 
 
To end the chaos, the Central Bank could adopt any of the policy approaches that do not use a Taylor 
rule.  There are many such policy designs in the literature that best could be selected by the Central 
Bank in accordance with the Central Bank’s mechanism design.  It is not the purpose of this paper to 
advocate any one of those alternatives. 
 
Examples could include using an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy. That approach 
produces its own dynamical problems in a NK Model, but not Shilnikov chaos. Another example could 
include monetary policy without interest rate feedback.  An open loop fixed monetary quantity growth 
rate would be the simplest approach.  More sophisticated modern approaches could include those using 
Divisia monetary quantity aggregates, such as those proposed by Belongia (1996), Serletis (2013), or 
Belongia and Ireland (2014, 2017, 2018) and as advocated by Peter Ireland in his role on the Shadow 
Open Market Committee. A long literature exists on alternatives to Taylor rule policies, such as 
Cochrane (2011).  
 
high. This tendency to switch between high and low values is also expected to last a long time into the future. Our 
computation (using 4000 iterations) leads to Hq ≃ 0.880417, which suggests high persistence in the time series. 
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4.2. Controlling the chaos 
 
If the Central Bank were to decide to retain imposition of the Taylor Principle and thereby the resulting 
Shilnikov chaos, a second instrument of policy would need to be introduced to deal with the 
consequent liquidity trap.  The need for such a second instrument, in addition to the interest rate in the 
Taylor rule, is widely accepted and has been applied by most central banks in recent years.  A survey of 
such new tools of monetary policy, such as forward guidance and quantitative easing, has been 
provided by Bernanke (2020) in his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association.  But 
what is less well established is how to design a rule for use of such an alternative instrument of policy.  
Under those circumstances, we would propose one of the available algorithms for controlling chaos.  In 
addition, we find that when the economy is on a Shilnikov chaos attractor set associated with 
imposition of a Taylor rule, the need for a second instrument of policy to control the undesirable 
properties of chaos should be retained, even if the economy is not in a liquidity trap. 
 
We now consider policy to control chaos. Assume the economy is enmeshed in a chaotic attractor. 
What should a policy maker do in order to alleviate the implied economic uncertainty, and bring 
agents’ inflationary expectations back in line with those coherent with the intended steady state? In 
each such approach, one of the new tools of policy would be adopted as a second instrument of policy 
to target, as an intermediate target, a long run anchor consistent with an available algorithm for 
controlling chaos. 
 
The methods of controlling chaotic dynamics in the engineering literature provide useful tools in this 
regard. Under certain conditions, undesired irregular or even cyclical behavior can be switched off.30 
An ingenious and well-known method for doing so is proposed by Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1990), also 
known as the OGY algorithm. It enables one to force a chaotic trajectory onto a desired target (a 
periodic orbit or a steady state of the system) by a correction mechanism. This mechanism has the form 
of a small, time-dependent perturbation of a certain control parameter. Suppose also that a 
neighborhood of the desired fixed point can be found, such that the system is guaranteed to be driven to 
the fixed point. If this neighborhood has points in common with a chaotic attractor, it may be used as a 
controllable target for the fixed point. 
 
To achieve control over a chaotic solution trajectory, the control parameter must be accessible to the 
Central Bank. This is a relevant point in our NK sticky-price model with Taylor rule interest rate 
feedback and a Ricardian fiscal policy. If we go back to the form of the eigenvalues in Example 1, it is 
clear that fiscal policy parameters can only govern the sign of the real eigenvalue.31 As a consequence, 
fiscal policy is ineffective in controlling chaos in the present setting.32  
 
30 There are examples of chaos control in the literature on optimal monetary models (cf., inter al., Mendes and Mendes, 
2006). However, those examples are developed in a discrete-time environment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt in economic theory with continuous-time dynamics. Experiments of chaos control are widespread in other 
fields of the economics literature. For example, there are the very recent contributions in tâtonnement processes (cf. inter al. 
Naimzada and Sordi, 2017) and in disequilibrium macroeconomic models (Kaas, 1998). 
 
31 Recall that τ cancels out in the computation of the characteristic equation. See also (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) in Appendix 1. 
 
32 A similar problem is discussed in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002). The authors describe the characteristics of 
fiscal policy schemes capable of eliminating the liquidity trap, while maintaining the assumed monetary policy stance. More 
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In this regard, we choose to operate through the manipulation of the nominal interest rate, ?̄?𝑅, at which 
the steady-state Fisher equation in (8) is satisfied. Since it is not under the direct control of the Central 
Bank, our algorithm treats manipulation of that interest rate as an intermediate target, rather than as an 
instrument of policy.33   
 
Before proceeding with the implementation of the OGY algorithm, some preliminary steps need to be 
taken. First, we need to show that system M is controllable. Then, we will need to discuss the region of 
the parameter space supporting application of the OGY algorithm. Consider the following initial result. 
 
 Lemma 3. System M satisfies the conditions for controllability. 
 
 Proof. Cf. Appendix 4.  ∎ 
 
Once controllability of system M can be established, the OGY algorithm requires that the eigenvalues 
of the controlled system be chosen such that stability is implied. Stabilizing a system is thus translated 
into searching for values of the nominal, steady state interest rate, ?̄?𝑅, such that all eigenvalues exhibit a 
negative real part (see Appendix 4). 
 
From Proposition 1, we know that there is a critical value, |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)|, such that if  |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| >
|𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)|, then an active-passive monetary-fiscal regime implies stability of the intended steady state. 
For notational convenience, let us define 
 
|𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| − |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| = 𝛩𝛩(?̄?𝑅) 
 
and denote 
 ?̄?𝑅𝛩𝛩+ = {?̄?𝑅  :  𝛩𝛩(?̄?𝑅) > 0}, ?̄?𝑅𝛩𝛩− = {?̄?𝑅  :  𝛩𝛩(?̄?𝑅) < 0}. 
 
We are now ready to prove the following. 
 
 
specifically, they find that by an inflation-sensitive revenue schedule of the generic form τ(a) = α(π)a + Rm the Government 
may manage to avert the unintended low-inflation equilibrium. However, this exercise implies a modification of the 
standard model presented in Section 1.  We therefore leave this type of analysis to future research. 
 
33 The choice of policy instrument or of market intervention operating procedure, to be used in that intermediate targeting, 
could depend upon the mechanism design of the central bank, which is not a topic of this research. An alternative OGY 
procedure could use the long run inflation rate, 𝜋𝜋∗, instead of the nominal interest rate, ?̄?𝑅. Although we believe that the two 
procedures would likely prove to be mathematically equivalent, we anticipate that an intermediate targeting OGY procedure 
using ?̄?𝑅 would be more easily implemented by a Central Bank than an OGY procedure using the long run inflation rate, 
which is a final target of policy. From a more technical point of view, and in order to operate an informed choice between 𝜋𝜋∗ and ?̄?𝑅, we have also computed and evaluated at the intended steady-state, the partial derivatives of 𝐺𝐺(𝐽𝐽) in (A.5) with 
regard to 𝜋𝜋 and 𝑅𝑅. This computation is helpful since in correspondence of a saddle-focus, the Jacobian of system M presents 
negative 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜(𝐽𝐽) and 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝐽𝐽) at the intended steady-state. Therefore, chaos control according to the OGY mechanism 
translates into varying ?̄?𝑅 or 𝜋𝜋∗ in such a way that 𝐺𝐺(𝐽𝐽) becomes negative. We found that, for parameters as in Example 3,  � ∂𝐺𝐺(𝐽𝐽)𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 �𝑃𝑃∗ ≪ � ∂𝐺𝐺(𝐽𝐽)𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅 �𝑃𝑃∗, implying that using ?̄?𝑅 has proportionally much higher stabilization power than varying 𝜋𝜋∗.  
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 Proposition 3. (Chaos control in the sticky-price NK model with money in the utility function) 
Consider the case in which the policy-maker runs an active-passive monetary-fiscal regime and assume 
that ?̄?𝑅 ∈ ?̄?𝑅𝛩𝛩+ . Then, by Proposition 1, one eigenvalue is negative, and two eigenvalues have positive 
real parts. Assume, furthermore, that the economy evolves within a chaotic attractor. Suppose the 
policy maker announces commitment to a higher steady state nominal interest rate, belonging to the set ?̄?𝑅𝛩𝛩−. Then, the economy supersedes irregular and cyclical behavior and approaches the intended steady 
state. 
 
 Proof. See Appendix 5.  ∎ 
 
 Example 4. Let us denote by ?̄?𝐃′ the difference set ?̄?𝐃 − {𝛽𝛽} and consider the following calibration 
 ?̄?𝐃′ = 𝐃𝐃� ′ ≡ (350,0.78966,21,1,0.018,2).  
 
Set the triplet (?̄?𝑅, 𝜋𝜋∗, 𝐶𝐶) at (0.06,0.042,1.5), as in the preceding examples, and set 𝛽𝛽 = 1.78.34 Re-
running the algorithm for the presence of a chaotic attractor, we find that system M has a saddle-focus 
equilibrium with positive saddle quantity and a family of homoclinic orbits for values of the bifurcation 
parameter 𝜏𝜏′ belonging to the (extended) interval, 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′ ≅ (0.02613,0.27923). Set 𝜏𝜏′ = 0.15. For this 
specific parameter configuration, 𝐽𝐽 has three eigenvalues with negative real parts for any ?̄?𝑅 ≥
0.06767. Let us select ?̄?𝑅 = 0.07 and apply the OGY algorithm (as described in Appendix 4) to obtain 
the controlled system. In Figure 5, we superimpose the time profile of inflation (red curve), where the 
control has been initiated at iteration 800. 
 
Figure 5 Un-controlled and controlled inflation rate (control activated at the 800th iteration).  
 
 
The result in Example 4 might appear puzzling when compared to the policy prescriptions suggested by 
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002). However, a closer look at the different comparative statics 
 
34 Since the two elasticities, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛷𝛷 are very close, there is a very large divide between |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| and |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)|; and ?̄?𝑅 has 
to undergo a too large jump to make |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| > |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)|. In this example, we have therefore slightly decreased 𝛽𝛽. 
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implied by our model provides a full explanation of this apparent contradiction.35 Recall that Benhabib, 
Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002) maintain throughout the paper the complementarity condition in the 
utility function between real balances and consumption, 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 > 0; this implies that a drop of the 
interest rate increases consumption and real economic activity in the model, via the implied increase in 
money holdings. In our case, the same stimulus to the real activity of the economy is obtained by an 
increase of the interest rate, provided that we have assumed 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 < 0 (cf. Assumpion 2 above).36 In 
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002), stability is achieved through the simultaneous modulation 
of nominal interest rates.37 In our case, instead, it is the commitment to a long-run easing or tightening 
of the monetary policy stance, which is able to re-anchor expectations to the long-run target of 
inflation.   
 
As a check on robustness of our conclusions to our assumption of money in the utility function, we 
repeat our analysis of OGY chaos control to the alternative specification of money in the production 
function in Appendix 6. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Using the Shilnikov criterion, we find bifurcation to chaos in a NK model at plausible settings of 
parameters with common NK policy design.  The existence of chaos is consistent with the fact that 
economists who provide short term forecasts are rarely willing to provide long term forecasts.  Within 
the Shilnikov chaos attractor set, we find a downward bias in the interest rate and inflation orbits 
producing a phenomenon similar to a liquidity trap.  The problems associated with the zero-lower 
bound on nominal interest rates would thereby not be an intentional objective of central bank policy but 
of the dynamics of the system within the attractor set. The existence of this downward bias, evident for 
four decades of declining interest rates and inflation rates, has produced the puzzle of very low real 
rates of interest substantially below the marginal product of capital.   
 
That puzzle has often been observed and frequently unconvincingly imputed to oversaving.38 Our 
explanation is different and has different policy implications. Paradoxically, an active interest rate 
feedback policy can cause nominal interest rates, inflation rate, and real interest rates unintentionally to 
 
35 Cf. Wang and Yip (1992), Table 1, p. 555, for a complete derivation of the comparative statics of models with productive 
and non-productive money. 
 
36 Other crucial differences deserve to be mentioned. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002) modify the behavioral 
rules of public authorities, while the OGY algorithm merely uses a parameter bifurcation approach to induce a change in the 
topology of the dynamic system. Also our case is aimed at stabilizing irregular chaotic dynamics, whereas Benhabib, 
Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002) face the problem of eliminating a liquidity trap caused by an unintended steady state.  
 
37 Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2002) present two examples involving a Taylor rule stipulating low (in fact zero) 
nominal interest rates at low rates of inflation. In one of the examples, the paths leading to the liquidity trap are 
characterized by nominal interest rates that converge to zero but never actually reach that floor. In the other example, the 
nominal interest rate hits the zero bound in finite time. Here the central bank must be committed to lower nominal interest 
rates to zero as inflation becomes sufficiently low.  
  
38 Regarding that popular, but controversial, “loanable funds” explanation, see, e.g., Bofinger and Ries (2017). 
Paradoxically, that explanation is the opposite of the frequent overconsumption (under saving) explanation of the US 
balance of payments deficit with China. See, e.g., Hanke (2019) and Hanke and Li (2019). 
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drift downward, as a result of the dynamical response of the economy within a Shilnikov attractor set. 
Unlike an open loop interest rate rule, which would directly control an interest rate, active interest rate 
feedback rules are closed loop rules that link an interest rate to the dynamics of the rest of the economy.  
 
Our results strikingly resemble experience in developed economies in recent decades. We also find and 
investigate other complications for policy associated with Shilnikov chaos of a NK model. 
 
We propose two potential classes of solutions to the problem: 
 
(a) The policy design could be altered from an active NK interest rate policy to a fundamentally 
different design, such as active fiscal policy with passive monetary policy.  That alternative is 
known to produce its own problems in economic dynamics with NK models, but not Shilnikov 
chaos. Among the many other alternatives in the literature is the targeting of a Divisia monetary 
aggregate, in accordance with such proposals as those in Belongia (1996), Serletis (2013), or 
Belongia and Ireland (2014, 2017, 2018) and as  advocated by Lucas (2000, p. 270) in measuring 
welfare loss from inflation.39  By removing the Taylor rule from the NK model, such alternative 
approaches could prevent chaotic dynamics from occurring.  A long literature exists on alternatives 
to Taylor Rule policies.  See, e.g., Cochrane (2011). 
 
(b) A Taylor rule with interest rate feedback could continue to be used, but with the resulting Shilnikov 
chaos controlled through the use of a second policy instrument applied in accordance with the 
policy procedures advocated by engineers in the literature on controlling chaos. We find that the 
Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1990) algorithm could be particularly well suited to that objective. 
 
In subsequent research, we plan to explore robustness of our conclusions to different Taylor rules and 
to alternatives to the Ricardian fiscal policy laws.40 But we do not expect fundamental changes in our 
conclusions, which are systems theory properties of New Keynesian macroeconomic dynamics, when 
augmented by the closed loop interest rate feedback rules, characterizing all Taylor rules. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1. 
 
Let J denote the Jacobian matrix of system M, evaluated at the long-run equilibrium, and let starred 
values denote steady-state state levels. Simple algebra leads to the following (3 × 3) matrix, 
 𝐽𝐽 = � 0 (1 − 𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋∗))𝜇𝜇1∗ 0𝑗𝑗21∗ 𝑗𝑗22∗ 0− ?̄?𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗ �?̄?𝑅 − 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗ −𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ ?̄?𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∗ 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗ −𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗2 � 0 ?̄?𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀∗)�,        (A.1) 
 
 
where  𝑗𝑗21∗ = − 𝜓𝜓𝜙𝜙𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐∗𝜓𝜓 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗ −𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ ?̄?𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∗ 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗ −𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗2 + (𝜙𝜙−1)𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐∗ , and  𝑗𝑗22∗ = 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜓𝜓𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐∗𝜓𝜓𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ 𝜇𝜇1∗𝜂𝜂(𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∗ 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗ −𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗2 ) 𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋∗) . 
 
By relations in (1) and (4.b), and since 𝜙𝜙 > 1, we know that 𝑗𝑗21∗ > 0. The eigenvalues of J are the 
solutions of the characteristic equation 
 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 − 𝐽𝐽) = 𝜆𝜆3 − 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜(𝐽𝐽)𝜆𝜆2 + 𝐵𝐵(𝐽𝐽)𝜆𝜆 − 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝐽𝐽),           
 
where I is the identity matrix and where 
 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜(𝐽𝐽) = 𝑗𝑗22∗ + ?̄?𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀∗),                       (A.2) 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝐽𝐽) = [?̄?𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀∗)][𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋∗) − 1]𝜇𝜇1∗𝑗𝑗21∗ ,           (A.3) 𝐵𝐵(𝐽𝐽) = [𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋∗) − 1]𝜇𝜇1∗𝑗𝑗21∗ + [?̄?𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀∗)]𝑗𝑗22∗           (A.4) 
 
are Trace, Determinant, and Sum of principal minors of J, respectively.  Also define 
 𝐺𝐺(𝐽𝐽) = −𝐵𝐵(𝐽𝐽) + 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌(𝐽𝐽)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝐽𝐽) .          (A.5). 
 
Under the active monetary policy (𝑅𝑅′(𝜋𝜋∗) > 1) , we now determine the sign of the real parts of the 
eigenvalues with active or passive fiscal policy. Consider first the case in which the fiscal policy is 
passive, implying ?̄?𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀∗) < 0. In this case,  𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝐽𝐽) < 0. Consider instead the case of active 
fiscal policy, implying ?̄?𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜏𝜏′(𝑀𝑀∗) > 0. Then, both 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜(𝐽𝐽) and 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝐽𝐽) are positive. In this case, 
irrespective of the sign of 𝐺𝐺(𝐽𝐽), we have one eigenvalue with negative real part and two eigenvalues 
with positive real parts: 𝑃𝑃∗ is a saddle of index 2, and the equilibrium is locally unique. 
 
We now consider the local stability properties of system M in the neighborhood of 𝑃𝑃∗, when monetary 
policy is active. Assume that the monetary policy is active. Then, if the fiscal policy is also active, 𝑃𝑃∗ is 
a repellor, and there are no equilibrium paths besides the steady-state itself. Conversely, if the fiscal 
policy is passive,  𝑃𝑃∗ is a saddle of index 2, and the equilibrium is locally unique.                 ∎ 
 
Appendix 2:  Proof of Proposition 2. 
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Assume that the conditions in Lemmas 1 and 2 are satisfied.  If we start in the neighborhood of the 
origin, we know from Theorem 1 that, in the phase space of system (22), the solution trajectories are 
bounded to evolve forever in the neighborhood of the origin and are therefore valid equilibria. By 
construction, the results obtained for system (21) also apply to the original system of differential 
equations, M.               ∎ 
 
Appendix 3:  Proof of Corollary 1. 
 
Recall that 𝑀𝑀(𝑑𝑑) is the predetermined variable of the system, and that 𝜇𝜇1(𝑑𝑑) and 𝜋𝜋(𝑑𝑑) are jump 
variables. If we choose 𝑀𝑀(0) to belong to the tubular neighborhood of the homoclinic orbit, as defined 
above, we know that there must be a continuum of possible choices of 𝜇𝜇1(0) and 𝜋𝜋(0), capable of 
giving rise to recurrent paths, which are bound to stay forever within  𝐸𝐸𝜈𝜈 . Since all these recurrent 
paths are bound to stay in a neighborhood of 𝑃𝑃∗, such that the neighborhood can well exceed the small 
neighborhood valid for the local analysis, we have in fact global indeterminacy of the equilibrium.    ∎ 
 
Appendix 4:  Proof of Lemma 3. 
 
The algorithm for proving controllability of a given system requires that the nonlinear system be 
written in state-space notation. We first put the linear part of system (20) in the form 
 ?̇?𝑤 = 𝐽𝐽𝑤𝑤 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑤𝑤,              (A.6) 
 
where 𝑤𝑤 = (𝑤𝑤1, 𝑤𝑤2, 𝑤𝑤3)𝑇𝑇 , while 𝐽𝐽 is as in A.1. Moreover, 𝑀𝑀 = �𝜕𝜕?̇?𝑤1𝜕𝜕?̄?𝑅 , 𝜕𝜕?̇?𝑤2𝜕𝜕?̄?𝑅 , 𝜕𝜕?̇?𝑤3𝜕𝜕?̄?𝑅 �𝑇𝑇, while 𝑀𝑀 =
(𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, 𝑘𝑘3) is a (1 × 3) vector.  System (A.6) now needs to be put into its first-companion form, 
 ?̇?𝜔 = (𝐴𝐴 − 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀)𝜔𝜔.              (A.7) 
 
Here 𝜔𝜔 = (𝜔𝜔1, 𝜔𝜔2, 𝜔𝜔3)𝑇𝑇 from the following transformation 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑇𝑇𝜔𝜔, where  𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇−1𝐽𝐽𝑇𝑇  is given by  
 𝐴𝐴 = � 0 1 00 0 1𝜀𝜀1 𝜀𝜀2 𝜀𝜀3�,             (A.8) 
 
as in (21), and where 𝐵𝐵 = 𝑇𝑇−1𝑀𝑀. In detail, the transformation matrix 𝑇𝑇 has to be chosen to satisfy the 
product  𝑇𝑇 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, with 
  𝑁𝑁 = [𝐵𝐵, 𝐽𝐽𝐵𝐵, 𝐽𝐽2𝐵𝐵]               (A.9) 
 
and  
 𝑁𝑁 = �𝜀𝜀2 𝜀𝜀3 1𝜀𝜀3 1 0
1 0 0
�.              (A.10) 
 
Controllability requires that matrix 𝑁𝑁 have full rank. Since, in our case, matrix 𝐴𝐴 is non-degenerate, the 
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controllability of system M by means of changes in the nominal rate is feasible.                 ∎ 
 
Appendix 5:  Proof of Proposition 3. 
 
The OGY algorithm requires that a desired form for the characteristic equation be obtained by varying 
the control parameter. In our case, the "desired" form implies three eigenvalues with negative real 
parts. In Proposition 1, we have shown that it can be done, if the policy-maker runs an active-passive 
monetary-fiscal regime, when |𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| − |𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)| = 𝛩𝛩(?̄?𝑅) < 0. Assume now that the policy maker 
announces a commitment to a steady state nominal interest rate belonging to the set  ?̄?𝑅𝛩𝛩− . Then full 
stability of 𝑃𝑃∗ is affirmed and the statements in the proposition are implied. Since 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚∗ (?̄?𝑅)𝜕𝜕?̄?𝑅  is invariably 
positive, there is a commitment to a higher steady state nominal interest rate. Example 4 below 
completes the proof by showing that there are regions of the parameter space such that  ?̄?𝑅𝛩𝛩− ≠ ∅.    ∎ 
 
Appendix 6:  Chaos and chaos control with money in the production function 
 
Results in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper are based on a NK model with real money balances as an 
argument in the consumer’s utility function.  As a check on the robustness of our results to that 
assumption, we now repeat our analysis with money in the production function, as in Fischer (1974), 
Stokes (2016), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2001b). We explore whether the onset of a 
Shilnikov chaotic attractor is confined to the case of money in the utility or extends to the case of 
money in the production function. This appendix provides the results of numerical analyses conducted 
in the NK sticky prices model with money in the production function. We investigate existence of 
Shilnikov chaos and control of that chaos. 
 
Consider the case in which the utility in (13) is replaced by a single-argument function 
 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) = 𝑐𝑐1−𝛷𝛷−11−𝛷𝛷  ,      (A.11) 
 
where c is consumption and where the symbol 𝜱𝜱 still denotes the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution. Consider, furthermore, introducing real balances into the production function (15) 
according to the constant-returns Cobb-Douglas formula 
 𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑙, 𝑚𝑚) = 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚1−𝜃𝜃,       (A.12) 
 
where θ is the share of labor so that (1 – θ) is the share of real balances in production.41  
 
Given the equations (A.11) and (A.12), we derive the first-order conditions from the Hamiltonian and 
rearrange the terms, to obtain the following (explicit) system of dynamic laws: 
 
System S: 
 ?̇?𝜇1 = (𝜌𝜌 − 𝑅𝑅 + 𝜋𝜋)𝜇𝜇1, 
 
41 Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohè, and Uribe (2001.b) consider a simpler functional form, in which money is the only input in 
production. Their setting can be retrieved by setting 𝜃𝜃 = 0. 
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𝜂𝜂?̇?𝜋 = 𝜌𝜌(𝜋𝜋 − 𝜋𝜋∗)𝜂𝜂 − 𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋) �(1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜙𝜙𝜃𝜃 𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋)1+𝜓𝜓−𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 𝑚𝑚�𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋)�𝜃𝜃−1𝜃𝜃 �  ,       
 ?̇?𝑀 = (𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋)𝑀𝑀 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚(𝑐𝑐(𝜇𝜇1, 𝜋𝜋), 𝑅𝑅) − 𝜏𝜏, 
 
Where, as in system M, the parameter A has been set to one. The calibration of this economy presents 
several complications. Since we have labor in the production function, we are faced with the calibration 
of the parameter θ in a constant-returns-to-scale setting.  This is problematic since, to the best of our 
knowledge, that has not previously been done with Cobb-Douglas technology. Therefore, we proceed 
according to the following steps. We first use θ as a free bifurcation parameter and numerically identify 
the values at which the chaotic attractor is found. Then, we discuss plausibility of these values with 
regard to the existing econometric evidence (cf., footnote 28).  
 
Consider the following Example. 
 
Example 5. Denote by 𝐅𝐅 the set of the deep parameters (𝜂𝜂, 𝜙𝜙, 𝜓𝜓, 𝜌𝜌, 𝛷𝛷). Assume  
 ?̄?𝐅 ≡ (350,21,1,0.018,2) ∈ 𝐅𝐅.  
 
and (?̄?𝑅, 𝜋𝜋∗, 𝐶𝐶) at (0.06,0.042,1.5), as in the previous examples. Solving the characteristic equation, 
the first result confirms that, as for the case of the money in utility function model, the complex-
conjugate eigenvalues do not depend on the fiscal parameters (𝜏𝜏, 𝜏𝜏′). We therefore look for values of 
the free parameter θ such that the steady-state is a saddle-focus equilibrium. We find that this requires 
θ ∈ (0.9325, 1). Re-running the algorithm in search of a chaotic attractor, we find that the intended 
steady state in system S satisfies conditions of Theorem 1 for all 𝜏𝜏′ ∈ 𝐼𝐼𝜏𝜏′ ≅  (0.0534,0.2754). Set 
therefore 𝜏𝜏′ = 0.15 as in Example 3. Then, given a triplet of the initial conditions 
(𝑤𝑤1(0), 𝑤𝑤2(0), 𝑤𝑤3(0)) sufficiently close to the origin, system S admits perfect-foresight chaotic 
equilibrium solutions. 
 
Therefore, by Example 5, when money is productive, the onset of a chaotic attractor in a sticky-price 
NK model with a Ricardian fiscal policy cannot be excluded. Comparing the regions of the parameter 
space, where the intended steady-state is a saddle-focus equilibrium with a positive saddle quantity in 
systems M and S, we find the following. 
 
Remark 5. Either when money enters the utility function or the production function, the accompanying 
coefficient must be sufficiently low for the intended long-run equilibrium to be a saddle-focus with a 
positive saddle quantity. Specifically, given the parameters in the examples above, we have 0.0901 and 
0.0675, for money in utility or in production, respectively.42 
 
Moreover, to verify the robustness of the results to changes in the parameters, we parallel the analysis 
of Sub-Section 3.2 and study the surface 
 
 
42 Small coefficients to real balances estimated with Cobb-Douglas production functions are reported in the recent literature 
(cf., inter al. Stokes (2016)). The finding of near constant returns to scale when appropriate measures of labor and capital 
are used along with exogenous technical change, the study provides a useful benchmark for evaluating the plausibility of 
low elasticity of real balances. 
37 
 
 
𝛀𝛀 ≡ 𝐁𝐁(𝐉𝐉) + 𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓(𝐉𝐉)𝟐𝟐 
 
for the money in the production function case. Setting 𝐅𝐅 = ?̄?𝐅, set θ = 0.95 and using 𝜋𝜋∗ = 0.042, we 
obtain Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Combinations of the (𝐶𝐶, ?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) parameters at which the intended steady-state of system S is a 
saddle-focus with σ = 0. 
 
The combinations of the remaining (𝐶𝐶, ?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) policy parameters, such that the intended steady-state of 
system S is a saddle-focus equilibrium with no saddle-quantity, are represented. Above the surface, the 
saddle quantity is positive. Below the surface, the saddle quantity is negative. Figure 6 matches up well 
with the analogous Figure 1: to have a saddle-focus equilibrium with a positive saddle-quantity, in 
presence of an active monetary policy (𝐶𝐶 > 1), the pair (?̄?𝑅, 𝜏𝜏′) can assume plausibly low values.  
 
We now investigate whether the chaotic motion arising from system S can be OGY-controlled. 
Recalling that the control parameter must be accessible to the Central Bank, stabilizing chaotic 
solutions implies the search for long-run values of the policy parameters ?̄?𝑅 and π, such that all the 
eigenvalues of the Jacobian associated with system S have a negative real part.  
 
Consider, therefore, the following numerical example, where we first take ?̄?𝑅 as the control parameter. 
 
Example 6. Set 𝐅𝐅 =  ?̄?𝐅 and θ = 0.95 as in the preceding Example 5. Consider the case of  (𝜋𝜋∗, 𝐶𝐶) =
(0.042,1.5) and 𝜏𝜏′ = 0.15. Then, as shown in Example 5, if ?̄?𝑅 = 0.06, the intended steady state of 
system S is a saddle-focus equilibrium with a positive saddle quantity. First, we check that system S is 
controllable. Then, using ?̄?𝑅, as the bifurcation parameter, we see that the Jacobian of S, evaluated at 
the intended steady-state, has three eigenvalues with negative real parts for any ?̄?𝑅 belonging to the 
interval 𝐼𝐼?̄?𝑅 ≅ (0.0302,0.0427). Suppose now the policy-maker announces a commitment to ?̄?𝑅 ∈ 𝐼𝐼?̄?𝑅. 
Then, by the OGY algorithm, the economy supersedes irregular and cyclical behavior and approaches 
the intended steady state.  
 
Notice that, contrary to the money in utility function model, the policy-maker’s commitment must be to 
lower the steady state nominal interest rate.43 Again, as discussed at the end of Section 4, what is 
 
43 The result is invariably confirmed by extensive numerical simulations made on different regions of the “deep” parameters 
of the economy. 
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ultimately required for the economy to be stabilized is that the monetary impulse be positive for real 
economic activity. In the present case of productive money, the comparative statics invariably implies a 
positive partial derivative between c (and therefore y) and money holdings. Therefore, a commitment to 
a reduction of the long-run interest rate immediately raises money balances. 
 
 
 
